Part III
The fall of Srebrenica

Chapter 6
The Fall of Srebrenica: 6 to
11 July 1995

19. The Morning of 11 July: Is Close Air
Support Coming?

Once the
mist had lifted, at around 08.00 hours Dutchbat submitted the first request for
Close Air Support that day on two targets that were threatening Srebrenica. The
VRS were still south of Horizontal 84, which the Bosnia-Hercegovina Command in
Sarajevo viewed as the final line of the VRS advance.

Major
Wieffer maintained contact with the Air Operations Coordination Center in
Sarajevo from the Ops Room (although that was contrary to the prevailing rules,
which, in the case of imminent bombing, required him to take shelter in the
compound in Potocari). The Ops Room was however calmer than the so-called ‘bobo
bunker’ that had been set up for command purposes, and where all radio traffic
and satellite communications with the outside world came in.

To his
amazement, Wieffer was unable to arrange Close Air Support by telephone and was
informed that he had to do so in writing. He did however talk to the Air
Operations Coordination Center about
targets and priorities. The two targets mentioned were the VRS artillery
positions in the north that directly threatened Potocari, and the VRS tanks in
the south. The request was then sent to Tuzla and Wieffer contacted the
headquarters of Sector North East. He was initially put through to a captain,
then a major, and finally to a section chief. After that Major Franken took over
the conversation. [1]

Wieffer was extremely angry about the delays in Tuzla. Franken then
talked to the officer in charge of operations (the G-3) of Sector North East,
the Pakistani Lieutenant-Colonel Rachid Sadiki. Franken was told that Tuzla too
had to follow the set procedures – he first had to send a new fax, as the wrong
forms had been used for the request. Franken immediately instructed his
personnel to complete the correct forms, whereupon the staff hurriedly compiled
a handwritten fax and sent it to Tuzla.[2]
Sadiki however established that only ten of the required fifteen items had been
filled in (he had not been briefed that that only the most important items
needed to be filled in before sending the request to Sarajevo). He then sent the
form (in military terms: the format for an Air Request) back to Srebrenica. An
extremely angry Franken then called Brantz and recounted his experiences with
the staff at Sector North East. Brantz thereupon assigned the military engineer,
Captain Emiel Post to handle the request procedure.[3]

The
application procedure between Tuzla and Potocari created a delay. The delay was
exacerbated by the absence of an Air Liaison Officer in the office where the
request was being processed as well as the fact that the officers from the
non-NATO countries insisted on strict observance of their orders; which resulted
in delays, mutual misunderstanding and irritation.

Dutchbat also heard a rumour that a broken fax machine had caused
additional delays; however, Brantz claimed that this had had no effect on the
procedure. The crypto fax of the staff of Sector North East in Tuzla had indeed
been out of order, but the Communication Centre there also had a crypto fax, and
the request for Close Air Support
came in via the latter machine.[4]

Tuzla
sent the request directly to Sarajevo. At 08.39 hours Sarajevo confirmed receipt
of the request and Brantz let them know that the aircraft could arrive at their
targets about thirty minutes after they had been authorised.[5]
Karremans interpreted the latter message as meaning that the attacks on the hard
targets south of Horizontal 84 would be forthcoming and that everything in the
kill box south of Srebrenica would be attacked – he had been under that
impression from 9 July.[6]

At
09.45 hours Tuzla however received a message from Sarajevo the request had been
refused. Brantz was not clear about the reason.[7]
Karremans in his book claims that he had heard from Brantz that Zagreb had
refused the request; however, that was not the case. The request never reached
Zagreb – only the target list made it there.[8]
Karremans heard from Nicolai in Sarajevo that the conditions had not been
fulfilled, as neither Dutchbat nor the city were under attack.[9]

The VRS Push On: New Requests for Close
Air Support

At 08.45
hours, the Commander of the Drina Corps, General Milenko Zivanovic, from his
headquarters in Vlasenica, issued an order to the VRS in Srebrenica to
accelerate the operation. Based on radio traffic, the ABiH in Tuzla were able to
determine that the VRS were coming closer to the city.[10]

At
around 10.00 hours the VRS brigade commanders reported to the Forward Command
Post in Pribicevac that all set objectives had been taken. With the occupation
of Bojna, which dominates the southern access to the city, and Mount Kak and
Alibegovac, Srebrenica had effectively been cut off from Zepa. That was the
original goal of Operation Krivaja ‘95. At that point Mladic was present at the
command post in Pribicevac, and issued an order to continue the advance with an
attack on the town of Srebrenica.[11]

B
Company then established that, at that point, the VRS were located one kilometre
within Horizontal 84. Captain Groen saw this as sufficient cause to submit a new
request for Close Air Support.[12]
For NATO in Vicenza that was the critical point at which ‘the fog of war’ set
in. There were reports of several tanks occupying the higher ground of Mount Kak
- in other words, to the west, and at a significant distance from the Bravo 1
blocking position. However, based on a briefing by Nicolai, Vicenza had
understood that the infantry and armour were concentrated just above the
city.

Vicenza was also familiar with the fact that a Dutchbat patrol had
been fired upon, had fired back and had returned to the city during a mission to
survey the situation. This probably referred to the incident concerning the APC
(Bravo 1) of Lieutenant Egbers. At that point all attention in Vicenza began to
focus on Srebrenica. The only locations still needed in Vicenza at that moment
were those of the Forward Air Controllers in Srebrenica, and they were known to
all parties concerned.[13]

At about
10.00 hours, Karremans submitted his second request of the day to the Air
Operations Coordination Center in
Sarajevo. This request only included a single target, namely a tank south of
Srebrenica. Karremans called Tuzla directly, but was informed that the request
had to be submitted in writing.[14]
Karremens explained that, according to Brantz, the responsible staff
official in Sarajevo was required to show that the attack directly concerned
UNPROFOR units. A great deal of time had been lost in the process of
establishing an agreement between Dutchbat and UNPROFOR - by which time Sarajevo
reported that no aircraft were available, as they had all returned to their
bases in Italy at 10.35 hours (in military terms: had terminated their airborne
alert).

Potocari was apparently surprised by that decision. In Brantz’ view
Dutchbat had limited understanding of the Close Air Support policy as applied
after the bombings at Pale.

Nicolai had consented to the aircraft returning to their base, as he
had heard almost nothing more from Srebrenica on that morning, and had assumed
that the situation had stabilised. Brantz however said that he had been alerted
by Sarajevo that a request was on its way. Nicolai denied that.[15]

Shortly after that there was a notable speeding up of the handling of
requests for Close Air Support in both Sarajevo and Zagreb. At 10.50, the
Dutchbat request handed in at 10.00 hours, reached Sarajevo.[16]
By 11.15 the Deputy Commander of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Command, General
Gobilliard, had signed the Blue Sword Request and asked Force Commander Janvier
to do the same.[17]
By 11.17 hours the staff of the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force in Vicenza heard
that a Dutchbat request for Close Air Support in Sarajevo had been approved.
Vicenza was however not sure at that time what the listed target was, as it was
located in the furthest northern tip of the enclave, and it was not known
whether OP-N had been attacked. Clearly Vicenza was still operating on the basis
of the previous request of that morning in which this target had been listed. It
was also clear to Vicenza at that point that fifty VRS soldiers, one armoured
and three other vehicles were concentrated on the southern edge of the city
preparing for an attack.

Nicolai in Sarajevo informed Gobilliard by telephone that UN troops
were now under attack. At that point Vicenza learnt from one of the NATO liaison
officers in Zagreb that Sarajevo was putting pressure on Janvier to authorise
Close Air Support: ‘If not approved now, it never will be’. Fifteen minutes
later, news arrived in Vicenza from Sarajevo that pressure was still being
applied on Janvier to sign the request. At that point the Air Operations Coordination Center in
Sarajevo listed the first target as a tank, even though it was not actually
firing at that time. As a result it became necessary to send out a Forward Air
Controller to determine whether there was an actual ‘smoking gun’ to target.[18]

Sarajevo was of the opinion that there were too few targets in the
north of the enclave. De Ruiter requested Dutchbat in Sarajevo to list more
targets in the north of the enclave to supplement the listed targets in the
south already listed. According to Zagreb those additional targets caused
further delay.[19]
That was however not clear from the logbooks, which only stated that an ‘updated
target list’ had been received at 12.30 hours.[20]

At
approximately 11.15 hours, once Zagreb had confirmed receipt of the request, the
Air Operations Coordination Center in Sarajevo received a report that the VRS
were attacking Dutchbat.[21]
At about the same time Zagreb too realised that the attack had been continued
and that the VRS had not pulled back.[22]
The Bosnian Serbs had most probably noticed on their radars the aircraft leaving
Bosnian airspace after they had been ordered to return to base at 10.35 hours -
which enabled the VRS to continue their advance into Srebrenica.[23]

At that
point the 182nd Brigade of the ABiH regrouped in the south-eastern corner of the
enclave. In the first hours after dawn the Commander of the Brigade, Ibro Dudic,
reported that the VRS were holding the lines but were not firing. According to
the report he had matters under control and the situation was normal. This was
rather encouraging in view of reports from the previous day stating that the
brigade was in a fairly desperate state and many troops had
fled.

At around
11.00 hours Dudic reported that the VRS were attacking. The Bosnian Serbs were
at the gates of the city, Dudic had lost control of his troops and was forced to
withdraw. At that point chaos broke loose as scores of ABiH soldiers fled with
their families. Dudic received an order from Becirovic not to withdraw and was
sent a company to reinforce his unit. He ordered the 28th Division Forward
Command Post and communication centre in the Hunter’s lodge to relocate to the
PTT building. The personnel asked permission to set fire to the building upon
evacuation, but Becirovic refused because he was still not expecting the fall of
Srebrenica. He was afraid that burning down the Hunter’s lodge would cause more
panic amongst the population who could take this as a sign that the VRS had
occupied the building. As a result documents of the 28th Division were left
behind and fell into the hands of the VRS.[24]

Once the
28th Division communication centre had been set up in the PTT building,
Becirovic had a short discussion with General Budakovic, the Chief of Staff of
the 2nd Corps of the ABiH in Tuzla, in which he reported that the situation at
the city entrance was beginning to assume dramatic proportions. VRS snipers were
firing into the city from high positions, which prevented all ABiH movement. The
population had already abandoned the city. On 10 July nine civilians were
reported dead and thirty wounded, and on 11 July eight had been wounded. While
NATO aircraft had still not gone into action, UN personnel were on their way to
guide aircraft to potential targets.

Budakovic
issued an order to regroup and to stop the VRS at the entrances to the city. He
re-emphasised that the Red Arrow anti-tank weapon should be used. Unfortunately
it had been rendered unserviceable by unskilled users. Budakovic also wanted the
War Presidency of the Opstina to make an effort to calm the public and to regain
control of the population. Becirovic however considered those orders
unexecutable. All communications were being conducted by courier and no one knew
with any certainty whether the couriers would be able to locate the Command
Posts they had been sent to.[25]

With
the exception of the struggle between the VRS and the ABiH for possession of
Mount Kak (which was taking place outside Dutchbat’s view), there were no
dramatic developments in the southern section of the enclave before 11.00 hours.
In the north things were however different: At 11.01 hours OP-N was shaken by
mortar and heavy machine-gun fire, the crew of theOP took cover. The shelling continued with intervals over a
period of thirty minutes, while a VRS tank fired at nearby ABiH soldiers. After
that the situation calmed down with limited further sightings of either ABiH or
VRS until eight ABiH soldiers unexpectedly forced their way into the OP and
demanded Dutchbat’s withdrawal so that they could occupy the OP. The OP
commander, in consultation with the Commander of C Company, Matthijssen, finally
persuaded the ABiH to leave with the agreement that, increase of a next mortar
attack, the Dutch would pull out so the ABiH could take over the OP. It took
another half hour to actually get the ABiH to leave.

The day
before, a supply team that had come to fetch two anti-tank weapons (Dragons) and
a weapon sight from OP-N had also been confronted by armed ABiH soldiers bent on
ensuring that the OP personnel did not beat a premature retreat.[26]

The
personnel of the Bravo 1 blocking position spotted a VRS presence to the west of
Srebrenica in the form of a small lorry (a TAM 110) moving on the tarred road
from Zeleni Jadar to Srebrenica, as well as an armoured vehicle, two cargo
lorries and some infantry in the hairpin bend on the same road.

At 10.44
hours Franken issued an order to relocate the blocking position to a location
500 metres further south, and to use an 81 mortar and the .50 machine guns to
‘persuade’ the VRS in the vicinity of the radio tower to pull back. At that
point the personnel of the blocking position also saw two Jeeps, a lorry, an
ambulance and an armoured vehicle on the same road. Approximately fifty VRS
infantry were moving in column along the road.

At 11.17
hours Franken authorised his units to fire at their own discretion;[27]
however, there were no indications that Bravo 1 did indeed open fire. For some
time there was no communication with the blocking position, most probably due to
the fact that the vehicles had been moving.[28]

Reports of
anti-tank fire and firing from north to south probably related to ABiH
activities. Subsequently a report came in of a VRS tank near the radio tower on
the way from Zeleni Jadar to Srebrenica, of gunfire in Crni Gruber to the east
of the enclave, new reports of anti-tank fire, and of fire fights between the
ABiH and VRS. Missile hits and explosions indicated renewed VRS artillery
action. A tank opened fire on the APCs from Pribicevac. The withdrawal of the
APCs from the Bravo 1 blocking position towards Srebrenica drew close fire from
the VRS.[29]
The commander of the ABiH artillery (the M-48 Howitzer that was still positioned above
Bravo 1) suffered a serious abdominal wound during the shelling and needed to be
evacuated.[30]

Lieutenant
Egbers was not at Bravo 1 at that point. He had temporarily handed over the
command to Sergeant Visser so as to return to the location where Forward Air
Controller Voskamp and Sergeant
Struik had remained after a previous round of shelling.[31] The three men were making their way forward over the two to three
hundred metres to the APCs when a VRS tank opened fire on them. Grenades
exploded right and left and they were forced to seek cover against the mountain
slope. Halfway back the
three men were met by the APCs that were withdrawing because of the firing. The
APCs picked them up and quickly pulled back to safety.[32]
At that moment several grenades exploded directly in front of the APC, which, in
Egbers’ opinion, would have hit them had the leading vehicle not stopped to pick
up the three men.[33]

A
grenade also exploded near the APCs and one of the two men standing outside the
vehicle was thrown against the APC. The driver pulled away so fast that the two
men failed to get in on time and were forced to hang onto the rails as the APC
made its way down the slope. The two men concerned later claimed that the APC
had run over the legs of a Muslim sitting with his legs stretched across the
road. There were several other ABiH soldiers in hiding along this mountain
slope.[34]
The driver, who was partially under armour, failed to notice anything to that
effect. One other person suspected that this might have happened; however none
of the others noticed anything.

As
mentioned before, an ABiH soldier had been wounded, but this was the ABiH
commander of the M-48 Howitzer that had been hit by the grenade. The ABiH
soldiers in the area however made no mention of such an accident, and there was
no subsequent hostility towards Dutchbat. To the contrary, an ABiH soldier later
returned a coffee mug dropped by Dutchbats who had been making hot chocolate in
the back of the APC when the shelling started. Insufficient evidence was
available to justify any hard conclusions about this incident.[35]

After
that the VRS concentrated their fire on the
north. Four tank grenades exploded at Height 469, more than eight hundred metres
from the compound in Srebrenica, at the location of the Forward Air Controllers.
Civilians in the proximity of the compound were starting to take flight. The
abandoned OP-H was hit by a grenade and three light VRS mortars. The VRS also
opened tank and heavy machine-gun fire at OP-H from the radio tower. By that
time the VRS were also firing into the enclave and at OP-H from Crni Guber and
the radio tower. There was no further visible sign of an ABiH presence and
Dutchbat only caught the occasional glimpse of a few isolated ABiH soldiers. The
only audible ABiH small arms fire came from the vicinity of OP-H and a few
hundred metres south of the market square. The ABiH fired four mortar grenades
from near the PTT building. Hundreds of refugees, including some armed soldiers,
continued to move towards Potocari.[36]

Towards
midday, VRS troops began to concentrate on the crests of the hills south of
Srebrenica, but still showed no signs an advance. Shortly after twelve the VRS
asked for an interview with Karremans in Bratunac, but failed to disclose the
subject of the discussion. Although they guaranteed Karremans’ safety, the
Battalion Commander failed to react to the invitation - Dutchbat was awaiting
the arrival of the requested aircraft.[37]
By 13.00 hours (according to the estimates of Medicins Sans Frontières), it had become
clear that the ABiH would not be able to continue the defence of the city for
more than another thirty minutes.[38]
The ABiH withdrew from the area around the market square with the VRS close on
their heels. The APCs also pulled back gradually from the market square to avoid
being surrounded by the VRS.

A grenade
hit the compound in Srebrenica, causing several casualties (Dutchbat’s reaction
to that is described in more detail in the Appendix, ‘Dutchbat III and the Population:
Medical Issues.’ One of the APCs lost a
track and wheel in the grenade explosion. Moments later an explosion occurred
directly behind the compound. In spite of the fighting and shelling, Major
Franken wanted all B-Company personnel to remain in the vicinity of the compound
in Srebrenica. The VRS next issued an order that refugees from Srebrenica were
not permitted to flee to the compound in Potocari. That not withstanding, the
first lorries with refugees and wounded left for Potocari.[39]

The Bravo 1
blocking position was then instructed to pull back to the Srebrenica compound
with the .50 machine gun pointing south. One of the two VRS tanks at the radio
tower on the road between Zeleni Jadar and Srebrenica kept its barrel aimed at
the withdrawal route of the Bravo 1 blocking position towards Srebrenica.

At about the
same time as the refugees (estimates of four to five thousand) began to overrun
the B-Company compound, the first aircraft arrived above the enclave. The
blocking position meanwhile made its way back to the compound at a walking
pace.[40]
ABiH Commander Ramiz Becirovic visited Groen in the Ops Room. He appeared shaken
and said that it was all over. That caused Groen to fear that the ABiH would not
let the rest of B Company withdraw, but that the desperate ABiH soldiers would
try to entrap them. Groen, with the help of an interpreter, secured Becirovic’s
permission to evacuate the refugees from Srebrenica city.[41]

[1] Interview E. Wieffer, 18/06/99; SMG
1007/25. Debriefing report Capt. Wieffer, 22/07/95. Sergeant-Major Van Meer
stated that Karremans had called and that he too had heard that the request
needed to be submitted in writing. (SMG 1007/25. Kamp Pleso, 22/07/95).
Franken said that he was the
one who had called.

[2] Interview R.A. Franken,
18/05/01.

[3] Interview C.L. Brantz,
11/06/99.

[4] Interview C.L. Brantz,
11/06/99.

[5] DCBC, 648. Sitrep Brantz to Sitcen
BLS 110800B and 110839B Jul 95.

[6] CRST. C-13 Infbat Lumbl, 15/1195,
No. TK95.213. Addressee not specified.

[7] NIOD, Coll. Brantz. Brantz Diary
(version January 2001).

[8] NIOD, Coll. Brantz. G3 Air to SO1
for FC, 16/07/95, CAS in Srebrenica. Chronology of Events. Brantz reported in
this diary that he had heard from Sarajevo that the request of 08.00 hours had
not resulted in a release in Zagreb.

[9] Karremans, Srebrenica. Who cares?,
p.193.

[10] ABiH Tuzla. ABiH Komanda 2.
Korpusa, 11/07/95,
Str.pov.br. 02/8-01-1221.

[11] ICTY (IT-98-33) OTP Ex. 399/a,
Interview of Radislav Krstic, 18/02/00, p. 12.

[12] SMG 1007/25. Report debriefings
Captain Groen and Hageman, 22/07/95.

[13] DOPKlu STAOOPER, no number. Logbook
CAOC 5ATAF, 11/07/95, 0910Z.

[14]
SMG 1007/25. Debriefing Sergeant-Major Van Meer, 22/07/95; Debriefing statement Lt-Col J.A.C. Ruiter,
27/09/95.

[15] NIOD, Coll. Brantz. Brantz Diary
(version August 1999), p. 101; Rohde, Endgame, p. 114 and n. 8; NIOD, Coll.
Kolsteren. Chronology of Events CAS Missions Srebrenica.

[16] NIOD, Coll. De Ruiter. Memorandum Maj. Frentz, AOCC
Sarajevo to Lt-Col de Ruiter.

[17] NIOD, Coll. Kolsteren. 'Chronology
of Events CAS Missions - Srebrenica', 11/07/95.

[18] DOPKlu STAOOPER, no number. Logbook
CAOC 5ATAF, 11/07/95, 0820Z, 0917Z, 0932Z, 0946Z.

[19] NIOD, Coll. Kolsteren. 'Chronology
of Events CAS Missions - Srebrenica', 11/07/95.

[20] NIOD, Coll. De Ruiter. Memorandum Maj. Frentz, AOCC
Sarajevo to Lt-Col de Ruiter.

[21] DCBC, Box 59. Overview of Citations
Logbook Air Operations Control Center, Annex A to Klu replies to Questions by
the Chamber on Srebrenica.

[22] Interview A.M.W.W.M. Kolsteren,
07/10/99.

[23] Interview A.M.W.W.M. Kolsteren,
07/10/99.

[24] Sefko Hodzic, Otpecaceni koverat, p.
265.

[25] Sefko Hodzic, Otpecaceni koverat, p.
265-6.

[26] SMG 1004/61. Dutchbat Ops Room
Monthly Register, 11/07/95; Debriefing statement Sergeant 1st Class Klinck,
12/09/95; information based on confidential debriefing statement
(41).

[27] SMG 1004/61. Dutchbat Ops Room
Monthly Register, 11/07/95, 11.17 and 10.32.

[28] SMG 1004/65. Logbook Coy, 11/07/95,
11.59.

[29] SMG 1004/65. Logbook Coy, 11/07/95,
10.21 to 12.06.

[30]
Dijkema, Dutchbat in Vredesnaam, p.
276.

[31]
Interview R. Voskamp, 08/10/98.

[32]
Interview R. Voskamp, 08/10/98.

[33]
OM Arnhem. KMar Brigade
Soesterberg, 'Sebra-Care-Team', 28/10/98, No. P. 586/b
006/1998.

[34] OM Arnhem. KMar Brigade
Soesterberg, 'Sebra-Care-Team', 28/10/98, No. P. 586. B
004/1998.

[35] OM Arnhem. KMar Brigade
Soesterberg, 'Sebra-Care-Team', 28/10/98, No. P.
462/99.

[36] SMG 1004/65. Logbook Co, 11/07/95,
12.19 to 12.56. .

[37] SMG 1004/56. Dutchbat Ops Room
Monthly Register, 11/07/95, 12.08. SMG 1007/25. Debriefing Sergeant-Major
Van Meer, 22/07/95. It is
possible that the aim of the invitation had been to threaten Karremans with the
death of the hostages; possibly after the VRS had learnt of the request for
Close Air Support.

[38] SMG 1004/61. Dutchbat Ops Room
Monthly Register, 11/07/95, 11.29 and 12.58.

[39] SMG 1004/65. Logbook B-Coy,
11/07/95 13.00 to 14.35.

[40] SMG 1004/65. Logbook B-Coy,
11/07/95 13.00 to 14.41.

[41] SMG 1007/25. Debriefing report
Captain Groen, 22/07/95.