Appendix II

Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1992 – 1995: The role of the intelligence and security services

Chapter 4
Secret arms supplies and other covert actions

2. Arms supplies to the ABiH: the Croatian pipeline

When the Security Council adopted resolution 713 on 25 September 1991, a document was on the table that requested every member state to stop supplying weapons and military goods to the warring factions from their own territory to the Balkans. It was the first Security Council resolution dealing with an embargo, three months after the outbreak of the conflict in Slovenia. By that time, various arms transactions had already been discovered. In early 1991, the Bosnian Minister of the Interior personally started purchasing Kalashnikovs and ammunition in Vienna.[1] On 15 August 1991, Russian-manufactured Kalashnikovs, American M-16 rifles, anti-tank grenades and rocket launchers destined for Yugoslavia were intercepted. The same happened in November. Furthermore, weapons that had first been delivered to Lebanon were sold off by this country because of the 'relative quiet' there. Various lots were bought back by Yugoslavia.[2] The German foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst, was also said to be involved in arms supplies to Croatia via Hungary.[3] At that time, the Bosnian Serbs had allegedly already received weapons.[4]

Resolution 713 did not imply that member states also had to stop the supplies from third party countries to the region. An enforcement mechanism for resolution 713 was adopted only in November 1992 via resolution 787. This called on the member states, individually or jointly via regional agreements, to stop the import by sea. The arms embargo was further tightened by the UN on 30 May 1992. On 9 October 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 781, which imposed a ban on military flights over Bosnia that had not been approved in advance. This was the well known No Fly Zone resolution. According to the mediator Lord Owen, his lobbying for the No Fly Zone resolution was partly inspired by his fear that Iranian aircraft would land at Tuzla Air Base, and the Bosnian Serbs would retaliate by stopping all humanitarian relief to them.[5] In spite of all the resolutions, UNPROFOR was not given the mandate to monitor or enforce violations of the arms embargo on land;[6] NATO and the WEU did do so at sea.

On 31 March 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 816 to enforce the earlier resolution 781. It permitted military action by the UN against 'fixed wing and rotary aircraft', if permission was given by UNPROFOR. NATO Council imposed a No Fly Zone above the former Yugoslavia to monitor flight movements, and within the framework of Operation Sharp Guard, a fleet on the Adriatic Sea attempted to apprehend and inspect all suspicious vessels. Nonetheless, all the warring factions attempted to purchase weapons, ammunition and military equipment from abroad and to import them into the region.[7] The question now is what military impact these secret weapons supplies had on the events in Yugoslavia.

The supplies were firstly a violation of the arms embargo imposed by the international community on the warring factions. The embargo was officially sanctioned by the Security Council. The supplies to, for example, the ABiH, could be interpreted by the other warring factions, such as the Vojska Republika Srpska (VRS, Bosnian-Serb Army) and the Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane (HVO, the Croatian Defence Council, the army of the Bosnian Croats) as a violation of the embargo, and thus could provoke a military response. In retaliation, the VRS could shell airfields with tanks, mortars or artillery so as to impede the supply.[8]

The supply of arms to the warring factions also affected the stability in the region, and in many cases inflamed the armed conflict. It is no coincidence that military equipment was often delivered a few weeks before the start of new large-scale offensives by the ABiH, VRS or Croats. This often went according to a fixed pattern: clandestine supplies; training, possibly supervised by instructors, for operating the new weapons; and subsequently the start of military offensives. Logically this could lead, or did lead, to situations in which UN troops were put in immediate mortal danger. After all, the UN troops' task was to control or monitor these airfields.

Finally, the secret operations are of interest because various statements pointed to the conclusion that the clandestine supplies usually led to rapid transit to the eastern enclaves, such as Srebrenica and Zepa. The VRS complained that the supply of new weapons usually facilitated new sorties from the enclaves into Bosnian-Serb villages and military positions, which in turn provoked a response from the VRS. This action-reaction cycle again put UNPROFOR troops in danger. In the enclaves, the ABiH actually all too often used the Observation Posts (Ops) as a cover in military actions against the VRS. It is important to reconstruct the secret arms supplies from Iran via the 'Croatian pipeline' and the Black Flights to Tuzla, because this will make clear that different NATO member states had different political and military views on the possible consequences for the UNPROFOR troops on the ground .

The background to the Croatian pipeline

On 4 September 1992, the CIA discovered an Iran Air Boeing 747 at Zagreb airport. Subsequent investigation revealed that the jumbo jet was loaded with weapons, ammunition, anti-tank rockets, communication equipment and other military equipment, such as uniforms and helmets, destined for the ABiH in Bosnia.[9] President Tudjman informed mediator Lord Owen accordingly. Apparently, he rejected Iranian involvement. [10] The Bush administration protested in Zagreb and the arms were confiscated, after which Croatia appeared to stop all further clandestine arms transport via Zagreb.

On 29-30 October 1992, Bosnian President Izetbegovic paid a visit to Teheran and entered into an agreement according to which Iran would again attempt to supply necessary goods via Zagreb. Turkey and Saudi Arabia also offered assistance but attached the condition that Izetbegovic should not request assistance from Iran. This did not dissuade the Bosnian from reaching an agreement with Teheran.[11] According to officials of an European intelligence service, Izetbegovic was a president who was less tied to the apron strings of the United States than everyone thought.[12] At least the former chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, was of this opinion.[13] After Croatia had normalized its diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1992, it was represented in Teheran by the Croatian Muslim Osman Muftic, who elaborated the details of the agreement with the Bosnian ambassador in Teheran, Omer Behmen, and a confidant of Izetbegovic, Hasan Cengic.

On 1 November 1992, an Iranian Boeing 747 landed in Zagreb with sixty tons of 'humanitarian goods'. A few days later the Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei donated $ 3.3 million to Sarajevo. At the end of November, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, paid a visit to Zagreb to discuss the further logistical details.[14] This was surprising, because in this period there was heavy fighting between Croatia and Bosnia.

Perhaps Bonn put pressure on Zagreb to cooperate. Close connections happened to exist between the German Bundesnachrichtendienst and the Iranian services. For example, this German service allegedly supplied computer hardware to Teheran, and it trained Iranian intelligence officers in Munich in 1992.[15] In the same period, a variety of clandestine arms supplies were set up for Croatia and Bosnia by Croatian Catholic relief organizations. They ran via Ludwigshafen under the leadership of Father Johannes, and involved walkie-talkies, helmets, sleeping bags, field kitchens and uniforms, which mainly came from old stocks from the GDR.[16]

On 19 January 1993, the Dutch Permanent Representative to NATO, Jacobovits, reported that his British colleague had announced that the United Kingdom had made démarches in various capitals in connection with large-scale violations of the arms embargo. Certain Islamic countries were then said to be in the process of collecting hundreds of millions of dollars for providing the ABiH with a serious offensive military capacity. The arms had to be purchased before a resort was made to enforcing the No Fly Zone.[17]

Clinton on the stage: American initiatives to lift the arms embargo

Around the time of the inauguration of President Bill Clinton, on 20 January 1993, the ABiH was in a poor position militarily, partly because the fighting between Croatia and Bosnia had flared up again. However, Clinton had a much more positive attitude towards the Bosnian issue than his predecessor, Bush, and during his presidential election campaign he argued for lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. The future Vice-President Al Gore especially was a supporter of tough politics in the Balkans and the arming of the Muslims.[18] According to the later Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, a sense of frustration was felt during the election campaign because of the Bush administration's Bosnia policy. Little attention was paid to Bosnia under President Bush. His priorities were the Gulf states and Somalia rather than holding Yugoslavia together. For ideological and political reasons, Bush explicitly opposed any further involvement with the developments in Yugoslavia. The Clinton campaign capitalized on this.

Differences of opinion existed in the American administration under Clinton about the extent to which they should become involved in the conflict in Bosnia. There were different ideas, because some (including Albright) had 1938 Munich as a frame of reference in their heads, while others had Vietnam. Everyone did realize that the Balkans would provide the United States with better access to the Middle East. They also looked at the united Europe and constantly asked why the United States always had to take care of everything. The Clinton administration therefore also looked more often to the UN, which had expressed its concern about the conflict. Albright remained opposed to lifting the arms embargo. According to her, this would serve no purpose whatsoever. The opposing pressure from Congress and the media to lift the embargo, should certainly not be underestimated.[19]

The later National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, was also already a supporter of a tougher Bosnia policy in the 1992 campaign. Lake had considerable experience with foreign policy. In 1969 he served on Henry Kissinger's staff and resigned in 1970 after differences of opinion with Kissinger on Vietnam, especially on the invasion of Cambodia. These experiences had formed Lake's ideas: there must be no involvement at all of American ground forces, because 'Bosnia is a much tougher neighbourhood'. For him, Vietnam was still the reference: 'Think ahead. Don't make commitments that you can't meet. And just don't wander into something.'

In his function, Lake constantly had to mediate in a wide variety of conflicts about Bosnia between and within ministries and intelligence services. The relationship between Lake and Christopher was also said to be under constant tension.[20] In the spring of 1993, Lake was closely involved in 'selling' the so-called lift and strike strategy, which advocated lifting the embargo and a more rapid and heavier deployment of air power . He discussed this proposal with Canadian officials, and said that his government envisaged only one option: 'lifting [the] arms embargo with arms going to Bosnian Croats and Muslims and air power to stop Serbian interference with these shipments.' According to Lake, lifting the arms embargo was the right path for the Americans. Training must be provided by a third party country, which must certainly not be the United States, but preferably a non-radical Arab or Muslim state. As far as Lake was concerned, any country except Iran could supply arms to the ABiH, preferably by lifting the arms embargo, but if necessary illegally.

Approximately 30,000 ABiH soldiers would be armed in the subsequent 3 to 5 months, starting with small arms. The force would slowly be built up from this basis. Germany would put pressure on the Croats to prevent them from claiming too large a share of the supplies that were to run through Croatia and were destined for Bosnia. Germany would also put pressure on Tudjman to prevent an attack by Croats on the Bosnian Muslims. Humanitarian relief should probably be stopped because of these supplies, but should be reinstated later once the ABiH had gained territory. According to Lake, the arms supplies would not prolong the conflict.[21]

Responses to the proposal to lift the arms embargo

This new approach was discussed with the United Kingdom and France. The response was somewhat predictable. London was fiercely opposed to supplying arms and ammunition, and Lake expected Paris to respond in an identical way. According to Lord Owen, the French view on the arms embargo on Bosnia was largely the same as that of the British. British diplomats were said to have reported from Paris that the American solution of lifting the arms embargo was the worst solution imaginable. Moving along this path would enable everyone to arm all other parties, which they said was sure to happen. Russian weapons would find their way to the Serbs, and the Islamic countries would respond in turn.[22]

A Canadian official asked Lake whether account had been taken of the safety of Canadian UNPROFOR and other troops on the ground, Lake's answer was a revealing and at the same time disconcerting: 'no'. According to Lake there were 'no easy answers. If he were back at college debating the issue he would take the no side.'[23] In Ottawa, highly placed officials responded indignantly to Lake's statement.[24] As a Canadian functionary in the same time remarked: 'We are back to a world of big power politics and that is not kind to nations like Canada. We are just another troop contributor now, and no one is asking our opinion'.[25]

Lake had evidently paid no attention whatever to the safety of the UN troops on the ground, and had accordingly also seriously underestimated the possible reactions of the Bosnian Serbs to lifting the arms embargo. According to the Canadians, most military analyses demonstrated that, even with sufficient arms, the ABiH would first require long-term training before any improvement in the command could occur. Ottawa, London and Paris, which all had ground forces in Bosnia, opposed this initiative. Although lift and strike was officially adhered to, it had now become clear to the American administration that it would not be feasible, partly as a consequence of criticism from Europe.[26] The Chief Political Officer of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, Corwin, expressed it as follows:

'Any sign of lifting the embargo will encourage a wider war, and a wider war will mean more refugees. The main reason why the European powers are in the former Yugoslavia in the first place is to prevent refugee flows to their own countries'.[27]

As David Hannay, Britain's permanent representative at the UN from 1990-1995, acknowledged later, the failure to take decisive action at crucial moments in the conflict was more due to the tensions between those member states with troops on the ground and those like the United States without. Whilst anxious not to undermine publicly the impression of allied unity, many NATO allies with troops on the ground were markedly reluctant. According to Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, formerly chairing the JIC and later leader of the UK delegation at Dayton, Ohio, the allies for a long time frustrated each other and were unable either to convince others of their position, or to concede to a different viewpoint.[28] And Boutros-Ghali cynically remarked: Washington devised a way to gain domestic political benefit from tough talk about air strikes, knowing that it was shielded from acting because its European allies would never agree to put their personnel serving with UNPROFOR in danger.[29]

In the spring of 1993, there were various spheres of influence that affected the United States. After the Gulf War it was payback time for the United States: there was an expectation in the Arab world (especially Saudi Arabia) that Washington would support the Bosnian Muslims. Furthermore, there was great pressure on the American administration from the media and from Congress, which was dominated by Republicans. In June 1993, Clinton received the head of the Saudi Arabian intelligence service, Prince Turki al Faisal, who was a close adviser to his uncle, the King. The Prince urged Clinton to take the lead in the military assistance to Bosnia. The American administration did not dare to do so: the fear of a rift within NATO was too great. However, the United States did consider the Saudi Arabian signal to be important, and therefore a new strategy was elaborated. Its architect was to be Richard Holbrooke, who started to look for a way to arm the Bosnian Muslims. In the summer of 1993, the Pentagon - the American ministry of defence - was said to have drawn up a plan for arms assistance to the ABiH, which included supplies of AK-47s and other small arms. This operation was to demand almost three hundred C-130 Hercules transport aircraft flights. The weapons were going to have to come from former Warsaw Pact stocks. The plan was rejected, however, for fear that it would leak out and to prevent protest from the European allies.[30]

The Croatian pipeline in practice until the beginning of 1993

In the meantime, Iran, and by then also Turkey, supplied arms via Zagreb to Bosnia.[31] In April 1993, there were again discussions on this subject in Teheran between Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Iranians, which were also attended by the Iranian President Rafsanjani and the Bosnian President Izetbegovic. Rafsanjani took this opportunity to offer to supply all old Russian weapons to Bosnia and Croatia, under the condition that the Bosnian Muslims arranged for the transport. There were still some rather sensitive issues between the two countries: during the visit Rafsanjani expressed indignation to the Croatian delegation about the bloodbath in Ahmici, a village in central Bosnia, where more than one hundred Muslims were killed by Croatian units on 16 April 1993.[32]

Arms and ammunition transport did not always proceed without a hitch. For instance, the Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic was able to recall an incident in February 1993 in which a delivery of Milan anti-tank missiles, destined for East Bosnia, was confiscated by Croatian militias. And the leader of the Bosnian Croats, Boban, told Vance and Owen frankly in March 1993 that he and Croatia had suspended the transit of arms because of the ABiH operations around Mostar.[33] Boban had done so before, in July 1992.[34]

Sometimes the Croats sent a signal to Sarajevo referring to the dependence on the Croatian pipeline. For instance, a convoy of the relief organization Merhamet was intercepted in central Bosnia. It was transporting relief goods, but arms and ammunition were found under false floors. At the end of March, the two governments attempted to reconcile these problems: President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic reached an agreement in which Croatia would continue to transport arms in exchange for Bosnian electricity to Croatian Dalmatia. Tudjman visited Turkey in April 1993 in enhancement of this agreement. Furthermore, Croatia purchased Russian helicopters destined for Bosnia, which were properly delivered in Tuzla.[35] As Sarajevo was very much aware of its dependence on Croatia, Izetbegovic visited Teheran again on 14 September 1993 to deepen the defence relationship.

Meanwhile Holbrooke[36] was becoming increasingly frustrated that the Croatian pipeline was not progressing well. Lake once described Holbrooke as 'high-maintenance'[37]. Holbrooke therefore proposed to deliver arms and ammunition to the ABiH via third party countries. Lake, who had always welcomed such covert operations[38], nonetheless found the plan 'too risky'. The Secretary of State, Christopher, shared this view. They did support ‘lift and strike’ but not ‘lift, arm and strike’.[39] Holbrooke's proposals did lead to a debate within the administration. Clinton and State Department officials considered supplies via Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. This was not new: in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia had already supplied arms worth $ 500 million via the CIA to the Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan. There had also already been a close relationship with Turkey in the area of intelligence for some considerable time. For instance, there were various American monitoring stations in Turkey, and there was close collaboration of the Turkish domestic security service with the CIA and the FBI in opposing the terrorism of the PKK.[40] It was proposed at least three times between 1993 and 1995 to engage these countries, but each time Lake and Christopher rejected it out of fear of leaks and European protests.

Will the Americans support the Croatian pipeline?

The head of the Croatian intelligence service - the son of the Croatian president - Miroslav Tudjman, visited Washington DC in the autumn of 1993. He spoke there with James Woolsey, the director of the CIA, and others. The cynical Woolsey welcomed him with the words: 'I hear that you've discovered the best kept secret in Washington - that we have no policy towards the former Yugoslavia.' When Tudjman stated later to the director of the National Security Agency (NSA) that intelligence for a stable regional solution to the conflict should not be sought in Bosnia, but in Washington, the American stated: 'If something is a secret, we can discover it, but not if it's a mystery.' Whether Izetbegovic's earlier visit to Teheran was also on the agenda remains unclear, but in any case Tudjman opposed the involvement of Iran.[41]

Meanwhile, from mid 1993, the idea arose within the American administration of establishing a Muslim-Croat federation. Washington wanted to bring an end to the conflict between Bosnian Muslims and Croats. In early 1994, the frustrations in Washington increased, partly because of the VRS attacks on Sarajevo and Gorazde. On Saturday 5 February 1994, shortly after noon, a mortar shell exploded on Sarajevo's Markale market, close to the cathedral. As a consequence of the attack, approximately seventy people died and some two hundred were wounded. It was the heaviest attack on the city. Blood and severed limbs could be seen all around the market. Western television companies chose not to broadcast large parts of the available image material because it was too dreadful. Nevertheless, the pictures that were broadcast did have 'a transforming political impact'.[42]

The incident coincided with a reorientation of the policy of the major Western countries, and two new major players entering the Bosnian drama. In addition to the UN Secretary-General's special representative, Akashi, the new British Bosnia Hercegovina Commander (BHC) in Sarajevo, General M. Rose, had taken over the function on 21 January of the Belgian General F. Briquemont. It was already noticeable during the NATO summit of 9 and 10 January 1994 that the US administration was in the process of reconsidering its position on Bosnia. William Perry, who had succeeded Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense, and General John Shalikashvili, who as the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken the place of Colin Powell, were more inclined to deploy air power than their two predecessors. During a visit by US Secretary of State, Christopher, to Paris on 24 January, the French government had also firmly insisted on a greater US involvement in the crisis in Yugoslavia. One week later, on 1 February, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, addressed Christopher in similar terms in Washington. What had happened on 5 February in Sarajevo market also eased the turnaround of the American administration to become more closely involved in Bosnia.[43]

The US diplomats Charles Redman and Peter Tarnoff were dispatched to Europe after the attack in Sarajevo. The message that they took with them was that the United States was prepared to cooperate towards peace in Bosnia, but at the same time wished tougher actions against the Bosnian Serbs; also, humanitarian convoys must also no longer be obstructed.[44] A suspension of hostilities on 23 February and the formation on 13 March 1994 of the federation of Croatia and Bosnia, in which Redman played an important role, calmed the armed conflict.[45]

The role of the Croats

The Americans were aware that Iran had been supplying arms via Croatia since 1992, but that this had stopped or had been significantly reduced temporarily because of the conflict between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia. The establishment of the federation now offered an opportunity to reopen the Iranian pipeline. That, and the increasing American involvement, were important milestones in boosting the arms pipeline between Iran and Croatia. The Croatian Minister of Defence, Gojko Susak, also stated that in 1992 and 1993 the Americans still had no interest in the smuggling operations: 'The Americans never protested. When they asked, we would say that our original weapons were simply hatching babies.'[46]

The government in Zagreb was nonetheless divided on the transit issue, which was understandable, because Croatia and Bosnia had been involved in fierce fighting around Travnik and Zenica. This died down only after the establishment of the Federation in March 1994. On the other hand, Zagreb also needed arms and ammunition. At first, Croatia suffered the most under Security Council Resolution 713, in which every member state was requested to stop supplying arms and military goods from their own territory to the warring factions in the Balkans.[47] However, Susak was a fervent supporter of Iranian supplies because, in spite of the conflict with the ABiH, by 'skimming' the consignments, many weapons could remain in Zagreb. Furthermore, with the new arms the ABiH could tie up Bosnian-Serb units and resources, so that they could no longer be deployed against the Croats.

Miroslav Tudjman and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mate Granic, were opposed to the resumption of the supplies, however. They feared an excessive Iranian influence and an intensification of the fighting between Bosnia and Croatia. President Tudjman nonetheless took Susak's side because the additional arms could ensure military successes. Tudjman need have no more worries that UNPROFOR would take action against the supplies: in spite of all the resolutions, there was no mandate to monitor violations or to enforce the embargo. Observers were not even allowed to inspect aircraft.[48] Classified CIA documents to which the Los Angeles Times managed to gain access, proved that the American ambassador in Zagreb, Peter Galbraith, had already taken initiatives for supplies. In February or March 1994, he spoke with his CIA station chief about the option of secret arms supplies to Bosnia, to which...

[1] Interview with B. Spasic, 16/09/01.

[2] 'Beiroet en de Balkan-connectie' ('Beirut and the Balkans connection'), Trouw, 10/07/91; 'Joegoslavische partijen op zoek naar wapens' ('Yugoslav parties in search of weapons'), NRC Handelsblad, 16/08/91 and 'Evacuatie waarnemers in Dubrovnik vertraagd' ('Evacuation of observers in Dubrovnik delayed', De Volkskrant, 13/11/91. See also: NMFA, DEU/ARA/00081, PR Geneva to Foreign Affairs, no. 0 Gevi478/15043, 26/07/91.

[3] Blank, Yugoslavia's Wars, p. 115.

[4] Cekic, Aggression, pp. 86-88.

[5] Owen, Balkans Odyssey, p. 59.

[6] UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124, Akashi to Annan, Z-1106, 22/07/94.

[7] Confidential information (14).

[8] James Risen and Doyle McManus also point specifically to this danger in 'U.S. Okd Iran Arms for Bosnia, Officials Say', The Los Angeles Times, 05/04/96.

[9] Jacques Charmelot, 'Arms supply embargo is copiously violated', AFP press release, 08/04/96.

[10] Owen, Balkans Odyssey, p. 47. The reporter Robert Dulmers was a witness to the arms smuggling with the Iranian aircraft, but refused to make it public. See: Karskens, Pleisters op de Ogen, p. 263.

[11] MoD, MIS/CO, Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 30/93, 28/04/93.

[12] Confidential information (48). It was even asserted that the CIA had evidence that Izetbegovic was on Iran's payroll. See: Vesti, 03/01/97.

[13] Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.

[14] Blaine Harden, 'Middle eastern Muslims Helping Bosnian Defenders Against Serb Forces', The Washington Post, 27/08/92 and John Pomfret, 'US Allies Fed Pipeline Of Covert Arms in Bosnia', The Washington Post, 12/05/96.

[15] Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, 'The Bundesnachrichtendienst, the Bundeswehr and Sigint in the Cold War and After', in: Aid & Wiebes (eds.), The secrets of Signals Intelligence, p. 155. See for other accusations: Dzamic, Psi Rata na Balkanu, p. 220.

[16] Thomas Deichmann, 'Pater Johannes, patriotischer Waffenhaendler', Die Tageszeitung, 19/03/96.

[17] NMFA, PVNATO. PVNATO to Foreign Affairs, no. Brni068/1872, 19/01/93.

[18] Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 159.

[19] Interview with M. Albright, 28/09/01.

[20] Jason DeParle, 'The man inside Bill Clinton's foreign policy', The New York Times, 20/08/95. See for Lake's attitude to the participation of ground forces: Anthony Lake, 'Bosnia: America's Interest and America's Role', Inside The Army, 11/04/94.

[21] Confidential information (19).

[22] Interview with Lord Owen, 27/06/01.

[23] Confidential information (19).

[24] Confidential interviews (2) and (62).

[25] Norman Hillmer and Dean Oliver, 'Canada and the Balkans, in: Schmidt, A History of NATO, p. 82.

[26] James Risen, 'Administration Defends Its OK of Bosnia Arms', The Los Angeles Times, 04/08/96 and Owen, Balkans Odyssey, p. 73. See also: Jason DeParle, 'The man inside Bill Clinton's foreign policy', The New York Times, 20/08/95.

[27] Corwin, Dubious Mandate. p. 85.

[28] Pauline Neville-Jones, 'Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia', Survival, Vol. 38 (Winter 1996-97) 4, p. 64.

[29] Mats Berdal, 'Relations Between NATO and the UN', Schmidt, A History of NATO, pp. 61-64.

[30] Paul Quinn-Judge. 'US Denies Giving Arms', The Boston Globe, 18/11/94.

[31] F. Chipoux, ‘Bosnians getting arms from Islamic countries', Manchester Guardian Weekly, 30/08/92.

[32] Magas and Zanic, The War in Croatia and Bosnia Hercegovina, pp. 268-269.

[33] MoD, MIS/CO, Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 21/93, 22/03/93.

[34] 'Bosnische president wil wapens van de Verenigde Staten' ('Bosnian president wants arms from the United States'), De Volkskrant, 09/07/92.

[35] MoD, MIS/CO, Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 24/93, 05/04/93 and no. 25/93, 13/04/93 and Duygu Bazolu, 'Implications for Turkey's relations with Western Europe', in: Jopp (ed.), The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis, p. 36.

[36] Holbrooke was never available for an interview with the NIOD despite various vigorous attempts by the Netherlands embassy in Washington DC.

[37] Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 178.

[38] Vernon Loeb, 'Tony Lake and the CIA', The Washington Post, 27/11/00.

[39] Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.

[40] Confidential information (35).

[41] Miroslav Tudjman, 'The First Five Years of the Croatian Intelligence Service', National Security and The Future, Vol. 1 (2000) 2, p. 60.

[42] Bell, In Harm's Way, p. 177.

[43] Cf. Tweede Kamer, Session 1993-1994, Proceedings, p. 3895 (Kooijmans, 16/02/94); Drew, Edge, pp. 410-411 en Schoemaker, 'Oorlog', p. 30.

[44] Interview with Charles Redman, 27/06/01.

[45] Andreatta, The Bosnian War and the New World Order, p. 14.

[46] John Pomfret, 'US Allies Fed Pipeline Of Covert Arms in Bosnia', The Washington Post, 12/05/96.

[47] Owen, Balkans Odyssey, p. 48.

[48] UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124, Akashi to Annan, Z-1106, 22/07/94.